


Public Choice and Public Goods

Public Goods

Public Choice in a Representative
Democracy


Bureaucracy and Representative
Democracy



Features of Private Goods

- ⊕ **Most of previous discussions focus on private goods**


- ⊕ **Two vital features of private goods**
 - ⊞ **They are *rival* in consumption**
 - **What is consumed by one person is unavailable to another**
 - ⊞ **They are *exclusive***
 - **suppliers can easily exclude those who don't pay**



Public Goods

- ⊕ **Public goods, such as**
 - ⊞ **national defense**
 - ⊞ **Center for Disease Control**
 - ⊞ **neighborhood mosquito-control program**
- are**
- ⊞ **Nonrival in consumption**
 - **One's consumption does not diminish the amount available to others**
 - **Such goods are available to all in equal amount**
 - **MC of providing the good to additional consumers is zero**
- ⊞ **Nonexclusive**
 - **Suppliers cannot easily deny it to those who fail to pay**


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Public Goods

- ⊕ **for-profit firms cannot profitably sell public goods**
 - ⊞ **Nonrival and nonexclusive,**
- ⊕ **In this case of market failure, government**
 - ⊞ **provides public goods**
 - ⊞ **pays for them through enforced taxation**


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Classification of Goods

- ⊕ **An economy consists of more than just private and public goods**
- ⊕ **Some goods are nonrival but exclusive**
 - ⊕ **Ex: One can watch a TV show without affecting the TV reception of other viewers**
 - ⊕ **Ex: A golf course, swimming pools**
 - Short of the point of congestion
 - producers can exclude those who don't pay the greens fees, pool admission.
- ⊕ **Once congestion sets in, these *quasi-public goods* become private goods**


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Classification of Goods

- ⊕ **Some other goods are rival but nonexclusive**
 - ⊕ **Ex: fishing in the ocean**
 - Fish can only be caught once
 - Costly for a private firm to prevent access to these goods
 - open-access goods
- ⊕ **Categories of goods are illustrated in next slide.**

6



Categories of Private and Public Goods


*Open-access goods are usually regulated by government,

*Public goods are usually provided by government.

Exclusive

Nonexclusive

Rival	Nonrival
1.Private Goods —pizza —crowded swimming pool	2.Quasi-Public Goods —Cable TV —uncrowded swimming pool
3.Open-Access Goods —ocean fish —migratory birds	4.Public Goods —national defense —mosquito control



Open Access Good: Fishing

由政府或國際單位管理

- 由於台灣與日本經濟海域互有重迭，台灣漁船常遭日方強勢驅離，近來引爆台灣漁民積怨。釣魚台主權爭議，政府應該堅持漁權與主權不可分，因為有主權才有漁權，政府擱置主權只談漁權的做法不利台灣。
- 專屬經濟區，又稱經濟海域，是指國際公法中為解決國家或地區之間的因領海爭端而提出的一個區域概念。專屬經濟區是指領海以外並鄰接領海的一個區域，專屬經濟區從測算領海寬度的基線量起，不應超過二百海里（370.4公裡），除去離另一個國家更近的点。該國對其專屬經濟區的漁業資源和礦產資源擁有開發利用或准許它國利用的專有權
- 台灣大西洋大目鮪配額被大幅刪減，立委羅志明22日在立法院提案，強烈要求行政院儘速成立海洋事務部，將漁權談判、漁船管理，漁工保障統一運作，否則我國遠洋漁業前途堪慮。

羅志明以最近大西洋大目鮪配額被大幅刪減為例，此種漁業談判涉及層面廣泛，絕非農委會漁業署可以單獨成功，再以我國漁船被索馬利亞扣押為例，這更牽涉到外交部，尤其還有中國漁工也需陸委會出面協調。因此，以遠洋漁業稱霸全世界的台灣，成立一個獨立部會的海洋事務部，保障漁業、漁權、漁船、漁工等等，實屬刻不容緩。

Optimal Provision of Private Goods

- **Private goods are rival in consumption:**
 - market demand for a private good =
 - sum of the quantities demanded by each consumer
 - → horizontal sum of all individual demand curves
- **Efficient quantity of a private good :**
 - market demand curve intersects the market supply curve

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Optimal Provision of Public Goods

- **Public good is nonrival in consumption:**
 - available to all consumers in an identical amount
- **Market demand curve for a public good is the vertical sum of each consumer's demand**
- **To arrive at the optimal level,**
 - Market demand curve intersects the marginal cost curve

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An Example of Public Goods


Mosquito Control

- ◆ **Consider mosquito control:**
 - ▣ **Neighborhood consists of only two houses**
 - Alan, and Maria
 - ▣ **Alan spends more time in the yard,**
 - → values a mosquito-free environment more than does Maria
 - ▣ **Government provide mosquito spraying (噴霧殺蟲劑)**
 - But how much?

◆ **See next slide**

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Market for Public Goods




D_a and D_m reflecting the marginal benefits of Alan and Maria.

Let MC of spraying is a constant \$15/hour.

The efficient level of output:
 MB of neighborhood = MC

→ 2 hours per week.

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
Who Pay for Public Goods

- **The government pays for the mosquito spray through taxes, user fees, or mix of the two**

- **The efficient approach:**
 - **Impose a tax on each resident = his marginal valuation.**

- **Two problems arise**
 - **Tend to understate their true valuation**
 - **Not fair: Tax based on ability**

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


Optimal Provision of Public Goods

- **Admit real value of the good → get a higher tax bill**
 - **Taxpayers are reluctant to offer information,**
 - **The free-rider problem**
 - **People try to benefit from a public good without paying**


- **Some households earn more → a greater ability to pay taxes**
 - **Taxing people according to their marginal valuations may be efficient, but it may not be considered fair or equitable**

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
Public Choice and Public Goods

- Public Goods
- Public Choice in a Representative Democracy
- Bureaucracy and Representative Democracy



Public Choice


- **Public choices:**
 - **Government decisions about the provision of public goods and the collection of tax, etc.**
- **In a democracy, public choices usually require approval by a majority of voters**
- **Frequently explain the choice of the electorate with majority rule**
 - **The preferences of the median voter**



Median-Voter Model

- ⊕ **Median voter**
 - ▣ preferences lie in the middle of the set of all voters' preferences
- ⊕ **The median-voter model predicts that under certain condition:**
 - ▣ the preference of the median, or middle voter will dominate other choices
- ⊕ **Consider the following situation**


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Median-Voter Model

- ⊕ **Consider three individuals that decide**
 - ▣ whether to buy a TV?
 - ▣ The size of TV
- ⊕ **The preference:**
 - ▣ Let $N =$ no TV, $S =$ small TV, and $L =$ large TV, and $p \rightarrow$ preferred
 - ▣ Person 1: $N \succ S \succ L$
 - ▣ Person 2: $L \succ S \succ N$
 - ▣ Person 3: $S \succ L \succ N$

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
Median-Voter Model

- **Game rule:**
 - **Make the decision by voting on two alternatives**
 - **Pairing the winner against the remaining alternative**

- **Small set vs. no-TV option:**
 - **Small set wins by getting the vote of individuals 2 and 3**

- **Small set vs. large TV:**
 - **Small also wins because individuals 1 and 3 approve**

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
Median-Voter Model

- **Person 3, the median voter, gets his most preferred choice**

- **Even if person 3 had preferred the large (or no) TV, he would get his choice**

- **Political candidates try to get elected by appealing to the median voter**


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Median-Voter Model

- ⊕ **This is one reason why candidates often seem so much alike**
- ⊕ **Other voters are required to go along with what the median voter wants**
- ⊕ **Other voters usually end up paying for what they consider to be either too much or too little of the public good**
 - ⊕ **Welfare cost of public goods**


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Public Choices

- ⊕ **Rather than make decisions by direct referenda(公投), voters elect *representatives***
- ⊕ **Representatives make public choices that reflect their constituents' views**
- ⊕ **Resulting public choices reflect the preferences of the median voter under certain conditions**


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Special Interest and Rational Ignorance

- **What do governments attempt to maximize?**
 - **No common agreement**
- **One theory that parallels the rational self-interest assumption:**
 - **Elected officials attempt to maximize their political support**

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Special Interest

- **It is possible that elected representatives will cater to special interests rather than the interests of the majority**
 - **Asymmetry between special interests and the public interest**
- **Consider the subsidy of wool production**

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Special Interest

The subsidy of wool production

- ⊕ **Government guarantees that a floor price to sheep farmers:**
 - ⊕ **Over \$75 million per year**

- ⊕ **Only one person, representative of the National Wool Growers Association, testify that the subsidy was vital to the nation's economic welfare**

- ⊕ **Why didn't any single taxpayer challenge the subsidy?**

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Special Interest and Rational Ignorance

- ⊕ **Households consume so many goods and services**
 - ⊕ **Neither time nor the incentive to understand the public choices**
 - ⊕ **Voters realize that they have only a tiny possibility of influencing the outcome of public choices**
 - ⊕ **even if the voter affect the outcome,**
 - **the impact is likely to be small**
 - **Ex: wool subsidy**
save less than 60 cents/year

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Rational Ignorance

- **Therefore, unless voters have a special interest in the legislation, they adopt a stance of rational ignorance**

- ***Rational ignorance* →**

- **A stance adopted by the voter**
 - **The cost to the typical of acquiring and acting on such information > expected benefits**


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Private Choices vs. Public Ones

- **Consumers have more incentive to act on information about decisions they make in private markets**
 - **Benefit directly from such information**
- **Since information and the time required to acquire are scarce**
 - **consumers concentrate on private choices rather than public choices**
 - **Payoff in making wise private choices is usually more immediate, direct, and substantial**


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Distribution of Costs and Benefits

- **The possible combinations of benefits and costs yield four categories of distributions**
 - **Widespread benefits and widespread costs**
 - **Concentrated benefits and widespread costs**
 - **Ex: Wool subsidy**
 - **Widespread benefits and concentrated costs**
 - **Concentrated costs and concentrated benefits**

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Distribution of Costs and Benefits

- ***Traditional public-goods legislation***
 - **Widespread benefits and widespread costs**
 - **Nearly everyone benefits**
 - **Nearly everyone pays**
 - **Usually has a positive impact on the economy**
 - **Total benefits exceed total costs**
- ***Special-interest legislation***
 - **Benefits are concentrated but costs widespread**
 - **Generally harms the economy**
 - **total costs often exceed total benefits**

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Distribution of Costs and Benefits

◆ Populist legislation

- Widespread benefits but concentrated costs
- Has a tough time getting approved
 - Widespread group that benefits typically remains rationally ignorant
 - → Provide little political support
 - Concentrated group will object strenuously
- Ex: Tort reform (訴訟制度改革)
- Trial lawyers that harmed by such limits, have blocked passage

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有關刑事訴訟制度變革議題補充說明(司法院)

- ◆ 司法院主張採行以當事人進行主義為原則的刑事訴訟制度，是以人民的角度出發的改革措施

一、避免人民無辜涉訟，減少法院誤判，以保障人民權益

依我國現行刑事訴訟法規定，擔任審判工作的法官，對於檢察官以被告有犯罪嫌疑提起公訴移送審判的案件，有依職權調查證據的義務，這個制度施行已有六十多年，讓我們發覺本來依法應在法庭上對被告犯罪事實負舉證責任的檢察官，卻每以工作繁忙為詞，未能盡到公訴人的角色，使得一個進步法治國家界定法官、檢察官應有不同功能的效果大打折扣。也就是說，檢察官往往會認為既然法官有應依職權調查證據的責任，縱使檢察官未到法庭舉證，仍有法官代為調查證據，以致使檢察官到庭實行公訴，流於形式。

由於制度的設計使然，法官應依職權調查證據，即便檢察官在法庭上怠於盡舉證責任，卻有堂皇理由而不受責難。其結果，不免衍生出一個嚴重影響人民權益的現象，就是從審判實務發現有很多被檢察官起訴的被告，在法庭上喊冤，請求法官務必還他清白。而事實上根據統計資料顯示，檢察官起訴案件經法院判決無罪案件約有一、二成左右，使我們不得不思考檢察官有無因認案件起訴後法官有應依職權調查證據的義務而未詳查事證草率起訴或不該起訴而起訴的情事。

雖然被告於起訴後，經法官審理結果判決無罪，洗清冤屈的，所在多有。但是試想一個清白百姓，本來就不應該受任何刑事程序的羈絆，卻因檢察官疏於查證或草率認定而必須面對現行刑事訴訟程序冗長的纏訟，就算最後還給他清白，他會感謝法院嗎？答案顯然是否定的。因為我們以為任何刑事訴訟的過程，加之於一個無辜的人民身上都是一種懲罰，何況有人說：「一人在獄，十人在途」。（一個人涉訟，將使全家人包括親朋好友為之奔波勞累）做為一個現代法治國家的司法部門是有責任防免的。

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同時，我們了解社會對當今法官判案常常遲延，有很多批評，甚至懷疑某些案件是不是誤判。我們承認法官辦案確有遲延情事，但是我們也要說法官也不是想能妥當而且迅速結案與正確裁判。有些案件之所以不能迅速終結，固然與目前法官工作負荷超量有關，但是我們也從很多案件一直在第二審高等法院和第三審最高法院間不斷發回審理發現，有些案件未能妥速審結與正確裁判，跟檢察官未能在案發後起訴前所有犯罪證據最鮮明的時候，運用豐沛的警力詳細蒐證，於起訴時提供予法院有關，因為案件進入法院審判已經事過境遷，可能物證已經滅失，人證已經不在，僅憑法官一己之力，要求其突破，迅予結案與正確裁判，實在太困難了。


基於以上的理由，司法院認為把現行刑事訴訟法上有關法官應依職權調查證據的規定，修正為法官沒有依職權調查證據的義務，把本來就是應該由檢察官負的舉證責任還給檢察官，這樣一來，檢察官對於他起訴的案件，在審判時就必須到法庭就起訴被告的犯罪事實提出證據證明，同時必須對被告或他的辯護律師所作的抗辯作出回應，如果最後未能提出充分證據證明被告犯罪，案件將受無罪判決。這一變革如果能夠實施，相信檢察官對於他所偵查的案件，在決定是否起訴時，一定會更加慎重。法官也因檢察官與被告在法庭上就證據的辯論，更能發現真實，減少誤判。如果能夠做到這點，那前面所說的人民質疑檢察官不該起訴而起訴、草率起訴及法官誤判的情事將不再發生，人民因之可免訟累，人民的權益也因此可獲得充分的保障。

Distribution of Costs and Benefits

● ***Competing-interest legislation***

- concentrated benefits and costs
- Market position of Microsoft versus AOL

● **Next slide arrays the four categories of distributions**




Categories of Legislation

Distribution of Benefits

		Distribution of Benefits	
		Widespread	Concentrated
Distribution of Costs	Widespread	1. Traditional Public Goods - National Defense	2. Special Interest - Farm Subsidies
	Concentrated	3. Populist - Tort Reform	4. Competing Interest - Labor Union Issues


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Rent Seeking

- **Participants to employ legislation that increases their wealth**
 - ▣ direct transfers (Ex:年金)
 - ▣ favorable public expenditures and regulations
- **Special-interest groups persuade elected officials to approve:**
 - ▣ market advantage
 - ▣ outright transfer
 - ▣ Subsidy
- **Such benefits are called *rents***
- **The activity that interest groups elicit these favors from government is called *rent-seeking***

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Rent Seeking

- **The government frequently gives special advantage on a producer group**
- **Abundant resources are expended to secure these rights**
- **Political action committees, PACs, contribute millions to congressional campaigns**


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寄望下屆立委讓陽光照耀國會（陸以正）

討論「遊說法」問題，有幾項觀念必須先予釐清：

- 第一，在民主制度下，遊說是不可避免的事，人民有言論、集會結社、與請願的自由，其中自然包括向立法機關說明對某事看法的權利。只有以賄賂手段「買通」了立法委員或各級會議員，讓他們護航某項法律，才算犯法，而賄賂如何認定，實屬不易。制訂遊說法，目的在防阻違法行為。美國僅華府一地，登記的遊說人達一萬二千人，每年總收入超過十四億美元，比外蒙全年國民總所得還高。華盛頓的K街已經成為遊說公司的代名詞，好像紐約的華爾街代表美國銀行界一樣。我們要未雨綢繆，阻止同樣情形在台灣發生。
- 第二，要制訂遊說法，必須能達成防阻不當利益輸送，杜絕黑金政治，與嚴禁不法關說的目的。牽涉範圍既廣，就必須有配套法案同時提出。因此「政治獻金管理條例」與「政黨法」應與遊說法同時審議。牽涉到「公職人員選舉罷免法」、「公職人員財產申報法」、「利益衝突迴避法」、乃至「公務員服務法」有關的條款，也都該同時修正。像現行選罷法裏那些陳義過高，因而無從執行的條款，應該務實地修訂，然後嚴格執行。不能像現在那樣，大家都在明知故犯，當政者可以選擇性執法，以致有法等於無法。
- 第三，假如有人以為現在來草擬這麼多法律草案，勢將曠日廢時，他就大錯特錯了。前政府執政時，這些草案早就由行政院送到立法院，而當時的反對黨也提過不同版本。在立法院的「遊說法草案」有六個版本之多，已經睡了兩年覺，其他配套法案也都擱置在旁，所以立可審議。若無此次電玩法的風波，這些草案還會繼續躺在那裏，無人理會。本屆立法院只剩幾天了，但下屆有許多新面孔，以澄清吏治，刷新國會形象自許。不論現政府是否把這件事視為當務之急，只要這批新科立委能破除情面，全力推動，下月開始，正可把國會自律運動，作為與過去劃分界線的分水嶺、里程碑。

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
Rent Seeking

- **Special-interest groups**
 - May engage in rent-seeking,
 - shift resources to activities that focus more on lobbying

- **This activities are unproductive**
 - do nothing to increase output
 - usually end up reducing output

- **If the advantage given to special-interest group requires higher income taxes,**
 - Net return individuals expect from working and investing will fall
 - Discourage the individuals

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


Rent Seeking

- **As a firm's profitability becomes more dependent on government**
 - resources are diverted to rent seeking

- **Special-interest groups have little incentive to make the economy more efficient**
 - They will usually support legislation even if overall efficiency declines

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


Rent Seeking

- ⊕ **Think of the economy's output as a pie**
 - ⊞ **the pie represents the total value of goods and services produced**

- ⊕ **Policy makers have three alternatives**
 - ⊞ **Introduce changes that increase the size of the pie → positive sum game**
 - ⊞ **Carve up the existing pie differently → redistribute income**
 - ⊞ **Fight! Cause some of it to end up on the floor → negative sum game**

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


Underground Economy

- ⊕ **When government taxes productive activity, less production gets reported**

- ⊕ ***Underground economy* :**
 - ⊞ **All market activity that goes unreported to the government**
 - **avoid taxes**
 - **activity is illegal**


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Underground Economy

- **Tax on productive activity has two effects**
 - **Resource owners may supply less resource**
 - After-tax wage declines
 - **Shift from the formal, reported economy to an underground, “off-the-books” economy**

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Underground Economy

- **Distinguish between**
 - ***Tax avoidance*(避税): a legal attempt to arrange economic affairs to pay the least possible tax**
 - Ex: buying municipal bonds because they yield tax-free interest
 - ***Tax evasion* : illegal**
 - Takes the form of either failing to file a tax return or filing a fraudulent return by understating income or overstating deductions

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Underground Economy

- **Underground economy grows more when**
 - **Government regulations increase**
 - **The tax rate increases**
 - **Government corruption is more widespread**

- **U.S. Commerce Department estimates only 90% of U.S. income gets reported**


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Summary


- **Rent-seeker and those involved in the underground economy view government from opposite sides**
 - **Rent seekers want government to become actively involved in transferring wealth to them**
 - **Those in the underground economy want to avoid government contact**

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
Public Choice and Public Goods

- ⊕ Public Goods
- ⊕ Public Choice in a Representative Democracy
- ⊕ Bureaucracy and Representative Democracy



Bureaucracy

- ⊕ **Elected representatives approve legislation**
- ⊕ **Implementing that legislation is typically left to bureaus**
 - ⊕ **Def: Government departments and agencies whose activities are financed by appropriations from legislative bodies(由立法機構編列預算支付)**



Ownership and Funding of Bureaus


- **Taxpayers are in a sense the “owners” of government bureaus**

- **If the bureau earns a “profit,”**
 - taxes may decline;

- **If it operates at a “loss,”**
 - Loss must be covered by taxes

- **Bureaus have different incentives than do for-profit firms**
 - The differences in the forms of ownership and in the sources of revenue,
 - → Likely to behave differently

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


Ownership and Behavior

- **An economic assumption:**
 - Behave rationally and respond to economic incentives

- **Private firm**
 - **Receives a steady stream of consumer feedback**
 - firm’s owners have a profit incentive to satisfy consumer wants
 - **If the price is too high or too low**
 - surpluses or shortages
 - **The promise of profits also creates incentives to minimize costs**

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


Ownership and Behavior

● **Government bureaus**

- **Public goods are not sold in markets,**
- **Less consumer feedback**
 - no prices and no obvious shortages or surpluses
- **Less incentive to act on any feedback**
- **Profits or losses are spread among all taxpayers and no transferability of ownership**
 - less incentive to satisfy customers
 - less incentive to produce output using the least-cost approach

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Ownership and Behavior


● **Pressure:**

- **Voters → elected representatives → bureaus**
- **Not precise**

● **Voters can leave if they believe government is too inefficient**

- **vote with their feet**
 - In US:
 - works at the state and local level
 - If voters dissatisfied with the federal government, cannot easily vote with their feet


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Bureaucratic Objectives

- ⊕ **What objectives will bureaus pursue?**
 - ⊕ **Traditional view:**
 - **public servants: serve the public the best they can**
 - **Not realistic: why we assume self-sacrificing behavior by public sector employees?**
 - ⊕ **Bureaus try to maximize the bureau's budget**
 - **Widely discussed**
 - **bureaus are monopoly suppliers of their output**
 - **offer the legislature the entire amount as a package deal in return for the appropriation**


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Bureaucratic Objectives

- ⊕ **Legislature has only limited ability to dig into the budget and cut particular items**
- ⊕ **If the legislature does try to cut budget,**
 - ⊕ **bureau will threaten to make those cuts as painful to the legislature as possible**
 - ⊕ **Ex: Cut education budget → abolish kinder garden**
- ⊕ **Budget maximization results in a larger budget desired by the median voter**


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Private vs. Public Production

- **Goods are financed by the government does not mean that they must be produced by the government**
- **Profit-making firms now provide everything from fire protection to prisons**
 - **Ex: ETC**
- **Elected officials may also use combination of bureaus and firms to produce the desired output**
- **The trend is toward increased *privatization* → production by the private sector of government**


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Private vs. Public Production

- **Legislators might prefer dealing with bureaus rather than firms**
 - **The bureau is more responsive to the legislature's concerns than the manager of a firm**
 - **Bureaus provide legislators with opportunities to reward supporters with government jobs**


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課堂報告

- 請舉例並解釋何謂 **quasi-public goods**和 **open-access good**
- 請解釋何謂 ***Populist legislation***
- 請解釋何謂 **rent seeking**
- 請解釋何謂 **underground economy**
- 請解釋 **Government Bureaus** 和 **for-profit firm**在 **incentive** 和 **behaviors** 上不同之處

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Homework

- 13. Optimal provision of public goods.
- 14. Median voter
- 15. Distribution of cost and benefits

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